MOUNT VERNON — The Ohio Supreme Court upheld a three-year, nine-month sentence in a Knox County case that set precedent for sex offender registration violations.
Knox County Prosecutor Chip McConville argued the case State vs. Ashcraft, noting repeat violators of Ohio’s sex offender registration laws are subject to a sentence for the violation itself and an additional three-year sentence for the repeat violation.
In a 5-2 decision, the Court stated Dec. 13 that the plain language of the statute allows the imposition of both penalties.
Michael Ashcraft was originally charged and convicted of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor or corruption with a minor in 2013, sentenced to three year term of community control to the supervision of adult court services. In March 2020, Ashcraft was convicted of failure to provide change of address, the offense for which he received the sentence that is on appeal in this case, the court states.
McConville argued the case in July.
“The sex offender registration law is fairly easy for offenders to follow,” McConville said. “It is surprising, however, that certain offenders just can’t seem to report their information. The Supreme Court has affirmed our strict interpretation of this law.”
“And there’s language in (the statute) that talks about in addition to any other sanction imposed by the court for the offense, and it refers to two different subsections. The one being for the offense itself and the other one being for the fact that it’s a repeat offense. So no one had ever been sentenced to more than three years for one of these before.”
McConville said the definition of the sanction implemented by the general assembly and the Ohio Revised Code includes prison, meaning a prison term could be imposed for the offense itself, plus the three-year sanction.
“This set of facts had never been in front of the Supreme Court before,” McConville said.
The court ruled that it must assume the statute meant what it said — that the penalty is in addition to any penalty or sanction imposed under any other provision of law.
“That clearly includes the base penalty statute,” the court’s ruling reads. “Ashcraft’s nine-month prison term is a sanction because it is a punishment imposed on him for the offense, and it also expressly included within the definition of ‘sanction’ because it was imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.14.”
Justice Patrick Fischer wrote the general assembly chose broad language, and “we must assume that the general assembly meant to include everything encompassed by that language. If the GA had wanted to exclude prison terms, it could have done so by simply stating ‘expect prison terms.’ But it did not. For us to exclude prison terms from the phrase ‘any penalty or sanction’ would be to alter the language of the statute, which we are not permitted to do.
“But we cannot rewrite the statute to avoid constitutional issues. We must interpret the statute as it is written. Reading the statute in the way the dissenting opinions propose would require us to bend over backwards to completely ignore words that the General Assembly chose to include in the statute.”
During the case hearing at the Ohio Supreme Court, Justice Pat DeWine asked Ashcraft’s attorney, Todd Barstow, a narrowing question about the statute’s language.
“You haven’t talked at all about what the language of the statute actually says though to any penalty or sanction,” DeWine said. “It’s pretty clear what ‘in addition’ means. It’s pretty clear what penalty means. Penalty includes a prison term. Seems like we have absolutely clear language here.
“How do you get around the language of the statue?” DeWine asked Barstow.
Barstow said the “sanctions imposed” could cover a “whole range of things,” including fines and court costs.
The argument in full can be found here.
In conclusion, the court found the “statutory language at issue is clear and unambiguous.
“We hold that a three-year prison term imposed under R.C. 2950.99(A)(2)(b) is to be imposed ‘in addition to’ any prison term imposed under ‘any other provision of law,'” Fischer wrote.
McConville said he’s flattered to argue a position that set law and case precedent.
“You know, we are pretty strict in enforcing sex-offender registration statues in Knox County,” he said. “I’ve been arguing you could interpret the law this way for a long time.
“It just took this case to give us a set of facts where he was actually sentenced to more than a three-year period. So that was really satisfying.”
In the former Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor’s concurring opinion, she urged the legislature to amend the language in the sentencing statute, “because I am not convinced that the general assembly intended R.C. 2950(A)(2)(b) to operate that way.”
“The repeat violation provision is quite convoluted.”
O’Connor went on to write “I am not entirely convinced that the general assembly intended to require courts to impose a dual sentence on offenders like Ashcraft when it enacted R.C. 2950.99(A)(2)(b). But it is not this court’s role to add words to or subtract words from a statute.”
“I urge the legislature to exercise its duty and consider rewriting R.C. 2950.99(A)(2)(b) to clarify its intent.”
Justice Michael Donnelly wrote in his dissenting opinion, “the majority’s claim that the clear and unambiguous language of R.C. 2950.99(A)(2)(b) provides a stand-alone prison term that is independent from and additional to the prison terms in R.C. 2929.14 majority opinion, is unfounded. If the ‘independent’ prison term in R.C. 2950.99(A)(2)(b) is ‘no less than three years’ is the maximum sentence allowed by the statute? Is it five years, 10 years or even 100 years? Or is it always three years, rendering the words ‘no less than’ superfluous? It is none of the above?”
“The trial court’s imposition of a nine-month prison term in addition to the mandatory three-year prison term was not authorized by law. I would reverse the judgement of the fifth district court of appeals and reduce Ashcraft’s prison sentence by nine months.”
